Certificateless cryptography, introduced by Al-Riyami and Paterson eliminates the key escrow problem inher ent in identity based cryptosystem. In this paper, we present two novel and completely different RSA based adaptive chosen ciphertext secure (CCA2) certificateless encryption schemes. For the first scheme, the se curity against Type-I adversary is reduced to RSA problem, while the security against Type-II adversary is reduced to the CCDH problem. For teh second scheme both Type-I and Type-II security is related to the RSA 
INTRODUCTION
Cryptosystem based on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) allows any user to choose his own private key and the corresponding public key. The public key is submitted to a certification authority (CA), which verifies the identity of the user and issues certificates linking his identity and the public key. Thus, a PKI based system needs digital certificate management that is too cumbersome to maintain and manage. Adi Shamir introduced the notion of Identity Based Cryp tography (IBC) (Shamir, 1984) to reduce the burden of a PKI due to digital certificate management. In IBC, the private key of a user is not chosen by him, instead it is generated and issued by a trusted author ity called the Private Key Generator (PKG) or Trust Authority (TA). This private key corresponds to the user's public key which is generated from strings that represent the user's identity, avoiding the need for cer tificates altogether. The PKG is responsible for gen erating the private keys of all the users in the sys tem and it knows the private keys of all the users in Al-Riyami and Paterson, 2003) addresses this issue to some extent, while avoiding the use of certificates and the need for CA. The principle behind CLC is to partition the private key of a user into two compo nents: an identity based partial private key (generated by the PKG) and a non-certified private key (which is chosen by the user and not known to the PKG). This technique potentially combines the best features of IBC and PKI. CLC also uses identities that uniquely identify a user in the system as in IBC but the public key of a user is not his identity alone but it is a combina tion of his identity and the public key corresponding to the non-certified private key chosen by the user. CLC involves a trusted third party as in IBC, named as the Key Generation Center (KGC), who generates partial private keys for the users registered with it. Each user selects his own secret value and a combi nation of the partial private key and the secret value acts as the full private key of the user. The authors of (AI-Riyami and Paterson, 2003) have shown real ization for certificate less encryption (CLE), signature (CLS) and key exchange (CLK) schemes in their paper. Huang et al. (Huang et al., 2005) and Castro et aL (Castro and Dahab, 2007) independently showed that the signature scheme in (AI-Riyami and Pater son, 2003) is not secure against Type-I adversary (ex plained in later sections), i.e. it is possible to launch a key replacement attack on the scheme and they also gave a new certificateless signature scheme. Many CLE schemes were proposed, whose security were proved both in the random oracle model (Baek et al., 2005; Cheng and Comley, 2005; Shi and Li, 2005; Sun et al., 2007) and standard model (Liu et al., 2007; Park et aL, 2007) . Recently, Dent (Dent, 2008) has given a survey on the various security models for CLE schemes, mentioning the subtle difference in the level of security offered by each model. Dent has also given the generic construct and an efficient construction for CLE. The initial constructs for certificate less cryp tosystem were all based on bilinear pairing (Cheng and Comley, 2005; Shi and Li, 2005; Liu et al., 2007; Park et aL, 2007) . Baek et aL (Baek et aL, 2005) were the first to propose a CLE scheme without bi linear pairing. Certificateless cryptosystem are prone to key replacement attack because the public keys are not certified and anyone can replace the public key of any legitimate user in the system. The challenging task in the design of certificate less cryptosystem is to come up with schemes which resists key replacement attacks. The CLE in (Baek et aL, 2005) did not with stand key replacement attack, which was pointed out by Sun et al. in (Sun et al., 2007) . Sun et al. fixed the problem by changing the partial key extract and setting public key procedures.
Related Works. Both the aforementioned schemes, namely (Baek et al., 2005) and (Sun et al., 2007) were based on multiplicative groups. Lai et aL in (Lai et aL, 2009) proposed the first RSA-based CLE scheme. They have proved their scheme secure against cho sen plaintext attack (CPA). In fact they left the de sign of a CCA secure system based on RSA as open. One may be tempted to think that the CPA secure scheme of Lai et al. in (Lai et al., 2009 ) can be made CCA secure by using any well known transformations like (Fujisaki and Okamoto, 1999b) , (Fujisaki and Okamoto, I 999a) but giving access to the secret value of the target identity and strong decryption oracle to the Type-I adversary makes the resulting scheme in secure. Moreover, the scheme in (Lai et aL, 2009 ) cannot be directly extended to a CLE scheme, whose Type-I and Type-II security relies on RSA assumption without making considerable changes in the scheme, hence we design a totally new scheme from scratch.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we propose two CLE schemes. The Type-I security of the first scheme is based on the RSA assumption and the Type-II se curity is based on the composite computational Diffie Hellman assumption (CCDH). Both Type-I and Type II securities of our second scheme are based on the RSA assumption. Thus, we provide a scheme which is partially RSA based (like (Lai et aL, 2009 ), but CCA2 secure) and another scheme which is fully RSA based. We formally prove both our schemes to be Type-land Type-II secure under adaptive cho sen ciphertext attack (CCA2) in the random oracle model. This is the strongest security notion for any encryption scheme. One of the striking features of our schemes is the novel key construction algorithm, which is completely new and different from other key constructs used so far in designing CLE. Moreover, our security model is stronger than the security mod els considered in the two existing secure schemes, (Lai et al., 2009 ) and (Sun et al., 2007) . First, the existing schemes do not provide access to the secret value corresponding to the target identity during the Type-I confidentiality game, while we provide the se cret value to the adversary. Second, we provide the strong decryption oracle for Type-I adversary. Strong decryption oracle means the decryption correspond ing to a ciphertext is provided by the challenger even if the public key of a user is replaced after the gen eration of the ciphertext (Dent, 2008) . We provide these oracle queries to the Type-I adversary of both the schemes and prove the security of our schemes in this stronger model. We stress that our second scheme is the major contribution in this paper and the first scheme is a stepping stone towards our fully RSA secure scheme. Even though computation of bi linear pairing has become efficient, finding out pair ing friendly curves are difficult (Freeman et aL, 20 I 0) and most of the efficient curves and means of com pressing are patented. Thus, we have only a hand full of elliptic curves that support pairing for designing cryptosystem. Besides, since the RSA patent expired in the year 2000, designing cryptographic schemes based on RSA assumption gets more attention these days. Hence, the research in pairing free protocol is a very important and worthwhile effort. We use the following well known hard problems to establish the security of our new schemes: Definition 1.1 (The RSA Problem). Given an RSA public key (n, e), where n = pq, p, q, (p -1) /2 and (q -1) /2 are large prime numbers, e is an odd integer such that gcd( e, <1>( n)) = 1 and b Ell lZ�, finding a E lZ� such that ae == b (modn) is referred as the RSA problem.
An RSA problem solver with £ advantage is a probabilistic polynomial algorithm 5tIlSA which solves the RSA problem and
Diffie Hellman Problem (CCDH). (Shmuely, 1985) , (McCurley, 1988) ) Given p, q, n, (g,tf',i') E Z�, where n is a composite number with two big prime factors p and q, also (p -1) /2 and (q -1) /2 are prime numbers, finding tf'b mod n is the Composite
Computational Diffi e Hellman Problem in Z�, where a, b E Z� dd.
The advantage of any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm !ll in solving the CCDH problem in Z� is defined as
The CCDH Assumption is that, for any probabilis tic polynomial time algorithm !ll , the advantage Adv� cD H is negligibly small.
2

FRAMEWORK AND SECURITY MODELS
In this section, we discuss the general framework for CLE. We adopt the definition of certificateless pub lic key encryption, given by Baek et al. (Baek et al., 2005) . Their definition of CLE is weaker than the original definition by AI-Riyami and Paterson (AI Riyami and Paterson, 2003) because the user has to obtain a partial public key from the KGC before he can create his public key (While in AI-Riyami and Paterson's original CLE this is not the case). We also review the notion of Type-land Type-II adversaries and provide the security model for CLE.
Framework for CLE
A certificateless public-key encryption scheme is de fined by six probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithms which are defined below: Setup. This algorithm takes as input a security pa rameter 1 K and returns the master private key msk and the system public parameters params. This algorithm is run by the KGC in order to initialize a certificate less system. Partial Key Extract. This algorithm takes as input the public parameters params, the master private key msk and an identity IDA E {O, I}* of a user A. It out puts the partial private key SA and a partial public key PPKA of user A. This algorithm is run by the KGC once for each user and the corresponding partial pri vate key and partial public key is given to A through a secure and authenticated channel.
Set Private Key. This algorithm is run once by each user. It takes the public parameters params, the user identity IDA and A's partial private key SA as input. The algorithm generates a secret value YA E S, where S is the secret value space. Now, the full private key DA is a combination of the secret value YA and the partial private key SA of A.
Set Public Key. This algorithm run by the user, takes as input the public parameters params, a user, say A's partial public key P P KA and the full private key D A. It outputs a public key PKA for A. This algorithm is run once by the user and the resulting full public key is widely and freely distributed. The full public key of user A consists of P KA and IDA.
Encryption. This algorithm takes as input the public parameters params, a user A's identity IDA, the user public key PKA and a message mE M. The output of this algorithm is the ciphertext (J E C S. Note that M is the message space and C S is the ciphertext space. Decryption. This algorithm takes as input the public parameters params, a user, say A's private key D A and a ciphertext (J E c. It returns either a message m E M -if the ciphertext is valid, or Invalid -otherwise.
Security Model for CLE
The confidentiality of any CLE scheme is proved by means of an interactive game between a challenger C and an adversary. In the confidentiality game for certificateless encryption (IND-CLE-CCA2) the ad versary is given access to the following five oracles. These oracles are simulated by c:
Partial Key Extract for IDA. C responds by return ing the partial private key SA and the partial public key PPKA of the user A. Extract Secret Value for IDA. If A's public key has not been replaced then C responds with the secret value YA for user A. If the adversary has already re placed A's public key, then C does not provide the corresponding private key to the adversary.
Request Public Key for IDA. C responds by return ing the full public key P KA for user A. (First by choos ing a secret value if necessary).
Replace Public Key for IDA. The adversary can re peatedly replace the public key PKA for a user A with any valid public key P K� of its choice. The current value of the user's public key is used by C in any com putations or responses.
Decryption for Ciphertext (J and Identity IDA: The adversary can issue a decryption query for ciphertext (J and identity IDA of its choice, C decrypts (J and re turns the corresponding message to the adversary. C should be able to properly decrypt ciphertexts, even for those users whose public key has been replaced, i.e. this oracle provides the decryption of a ciphertext, which is generated with the current valid public key.
The strong decryption oracle returns Invalid, if the ci phertext corresponding to any of the previous public keys were queried. This is a strong property of the se curity model (Note that, C may not know the correct private key of the user). However, this property en sures that the model captures the fact that changing a user's public key to a value of the adversary's choice may give the adversary an advantage in breaking the scheme. This is called as strong decryption in (Dent, 2008) . Our schemes provides strong decryption for Type-I adversary. There are two types of adversaries (namely Type-I and Type-II) to be considered for any certificateless encryption scheme. The Type-I adversary models the attack by a third party attacker, (i.e. anyone except the legitimate receiver or the KGC) who is trying to gain some information about a message from the encryp tion. The Type-II adversary models the honest-but curious KGC who tries to break the confidentiality of the scheme. Here, the attacker is allowed to have ac cess to master private key msk. This means that we do not have to give the attacker explicit access to par tial key extraction, as the adversary is able to com pute these value on its own. The most important point about Type-II security is that the adversary modeling the KGC should not have replaced the public key for the target identity before the challenge is issued.
Constraints for Type-I and Type-II Adversaries.
The IND-CLE-CCA2 security model distinguishes the two types of adversary Type-I and Type-II with the following constraints.
• Type-I adversary .911 is allowed to change the pub lic keys of users at will but does not have access to the master private key msk.
• Type-II adversary .911/ is equipped with the mas ter private key msk but is not allowed to replace public keys corresponding to the target identity. IND-CLE-CCA2 Game for Type-I Adversary. The game is named as IND-CLE-CCA2-I. This game, played between the challenger C and the Type-I ad versary .91/, is defined below: Setup. Challenger C runs the setup algorithm to gen erate master private key msk and public parameters params. C gives params to .91/ while keeping msk se cret. After receiving params, .91/ interacts with C in two phases: Phase I. .91/ is given access to all the five oracles . .91/ adaptively queries the oracles consistent with the con straints for Type-I adversary described above.
Challenge. At the end of Phase I, .911 gives two mes sages ma and ml of equal length to C on which it wishes to be challenged. C randomly chooses a bit 8 ER {O, I} and encrypts mE! with the target identity ID* 's public key to form the challenge ciphertext cr* and sends it to .91/ as the challenge. (Note that the par tial Private Key corresponding to ID* should not be queried by .911 but the secret value corresponding to ID* may be queried. This makes our security model stronger when compared to the security models of (Lai et al., 2009 ) and (Sun et al., 2007 BASIC RSA-BASED CLE SCHEME (RSA-CLE1)
In this section, we propose the basic RSA based cer tificateless encryption scheme RSA-CLEI and also prove the security of the scheme against both Type I and Type-II adversaries under adaptive chosen ci phertext attack (CCA2). For this scheme the Type-I security relies on the RSA assumption and the Type II security is based on the composite computational Diffie Hellman assumption (CCDH). Notation. We use the notation 'lL� dd to represent the odd numbers from [O,n] . Throughout the paper, in order to choose a random odd number from the range [1,n], we randomly pick an element in 'lLn and check whether it is odd, if it is odd, we accept it, else we subtract I from the chosen number. These numbers are represented as 'lL� dd .
The RSA-CLEI Scheme
The proposed scheme comprises the following six al gorithms. Unless stated otherwise, all computations except those in the Setup algorithm are done mod n.
Setup. The KGC does the following to initialize the system and to setup the public parameters.
• Chooses two primes p and q, such that p = 2p' + 1 and q = 2q' + 1 where p' and q' are also primes.
• Computes n = pq and the Euler's totient function <j>(n) = (p-I)(q-I).
• It also chooses four cryptographic hash functions H : {O, 1}* --+ 'lL�, H I : {O, 1}* x 'lL� --+ 'lL� dd , H2 : {O, 1}1 X 'lL� --+ 'lL� dd and H3 : 'lL� x 'lL� x {O, 1}* --+ {O, 1 }1+lz?,ddl, where I is the size of the message.
• Now, KGC publicizes the system parameters, params = (n,H,Hl ,H2,H3) and keeps the factors of n, namely p and q as the master private key. Note. Since n is a product of two strong primes, a ran domly chosen number in 'lL� dd is relatively prime to <j>(n) with overwhelming probability. The RSA mod ulus n is set to n = pq and p, q are chosen such that p = 2p' + 1, q = 2q' + 1 where both p' and q' are also large primes. Considering <j>(n) = 22p'q' with only three factors 2, p', q', the probability of any odd num ber being co-prime to <j>(n) is overwhelming, because finding a number not co-prime to 4 p' q' is equivalent to finding p' or q' or finding p or q. Thus, hardness of factoring implies that the random odd number in 'lLn is relatively prime to <j>(n) with very high probability.
Partial Key Extract. Our partial key extraction is not a deterministic algorithm, i.e. this algorithm gives dif ferent partial keys for the same identity when queried more than once. Examples for this type of key extrac tion can be found in (Baek et al., 2005) and (Sun et al., 2007) . This algorithm is executed by the KGC and upon receiving the identity IDA of a user A the KGC performs the following to generate the corresponding partial private key dA.
• Chooses XA ER 'lL� dd .
• Computes gA = H(IDA).
• Computes the partial public key PPKA = g� A • Computes the value eA = H I (IDA,PPKA).
• Computes dA such that eAdA == I mod <j>(n) and sends the partial private key SA = XA + dA mod <j>(n) and the partial public key PPKA to the user through a secure channel.
The validity of the partial private key can be verified by user A by performing the following check:
(1)
Note. However, this can be made deterministic by obtaining the randomness used in the computation of the partial public key through a secure MAC (Mes sage Authentication Code) with the identity of the user as input and the master private key as the key to the MAC.
Set Private Key. On receiving the partial private key the user with identity IDA does the following to gen erate his full private key.
• ChoosesYA EfI'lL� dd as his secret value.
• Sets the private key as DA = (D� I ),D� 2 )) (SA,YA). (Note that both the KGC and the corresponding user knows D� I ) and the user with iden tity IDA alone knows D� 2 )).
Set Public Key. The user with identity IDA computes the public key corresponding to his private key as de scribed below:
rP)
• Computes the value g A A
Note that g� A was sent by KGC to the user while setting IDA'S partial private key. The validity of the public key can be publicly verified using the follow ing verification test:
• Compute eA = H I (IDA,PK� I )).
• Check whether the following holds:
Encryption. To encrypt a message m to a user with identity IDA, one has to perform the following steps:
• Check the validity of the public key corresponding to IDA.
• Choose r Ell 7/.,� dd .
• Compute eA = H I (IDA,PK� I )), gA = H(IDA) and h = H2(m,r).
• Compute Cl = ,i4, and C2 = (mllr) EB H3 ((PKj l ))hCA, (PKj 2 ))\IDA ) .
Now, (J = (Cl ' C2) is send as the ciphertext to the user
A.
Decryption. The receiver with identity IDA does the following to decrypt a ciphertext (J = (Cl ' C2):
• Find (mllr) = C2 EBH3( 1 cl ,(cdJJA ,IDA) . User A accepts the message only if the above check holds.
Security Proof
In order to prove the confidentiality of a certificate less encryption scheme, it is required to consider the attacks by Type-I and Type-II adversaries. In the two existing secure schemes (Lai et al., 2009 ) and (Sun et aI., 2007) , the Type-I adversary is not allowed to ex tract the secret value corresponding to the target iden tity. In order to capture the ability of the adversary who can access the secret keys of the target identity, we give access to the user secret value of the target identity to the Type-I adversary. We also state that, al lowing the extract secret value query corresponding to the target identity makes the security model for Type-I adversary more stronger. e; = e and computes g; = � ; , .
Note.
It is to be noted that the tuple (lDy, ey, �y,gy) in the list L is equal to (IDy, e, �y, � � e2 ).
* Chooses Yi Ell Z� dd and computes PK; = (PKP),PK?),PKP)) = (�;,gj;,�;�� e i). C now adds the tuple (ID;,�;, gji , �; �� e i , e; ) into the list LI'. The public key thus generated passes the verification test done by !ill as shown below:
(PK p )) e i = (�;�� e i) e i = (��;��e T )
( 1 ) . -e2 = (PK i ) e 'g; (Since �; , = g;) * Adds the tuple (1D;,g�i = �;, e; ) in the list L1.
• C adds the tuple (lDi,ei,�;,gi) to the list L and returns g; to !ill.
O H I (ID;,!'!.. ;):
To respond to this query, C retrieves the tuple that corresponds to ID;, which is of the form (1D;,g�; ,gj; ,g�;, ei) from the list LI' and performs the following:
• If g�i = !'!.. ;, a tuple of the form (ID;,!'!.. ;,e;) will exist in the list L1, C returns the corresponding e;.
• If g�i cJ !'!.. ;, C chooses e; ER Z� dd , adds the tuple (/Di,!'!.. i,ei) in the list L1 and returns e; as the re • If i = y, C aborts the game.
• If i cJ y, C retrieves the tuple of the form (/Di,S;,g�i,y;) from list Ls and returns Si as the partial private key and PPK; = g�i as the partial public key corresponding to the identity ID;.
O/:"xtractSecretValue(ID;). C retrieves a tuple of the form (/Di,S;,g�i,y;) from the list Ls and returns the corre sponding Yi as the secret value corresponding to the identity ID;. If the entry corresponding to y; in the tuple is "-" then !ill has replaced the private key cor responding to ID;. O ll equestl'ubl i cKey (ID;). C retrieves the tuple of the form (ID;,g t ' ,gji ,g?, e; ) from the list Lp and returns PKi = (�;,�',�;��') as the public key corresponding to the identity lDi• O R eplacePubl i cKey (IDi,PK} To replace the public key of lDi with a new public key PK; = (PKY), PK; ( 2 ) ,PK; ( 3 )), chosen by !ill, C does the following:
• Updates the corresponding tuples in the list
. LI' as (/D;,PK i ,PK ; ,PK ; ,ei), only If (PK; ( 3 )) e i = (PK; ( l )) e i g;, where g; corresponding to ID; is retrieved from the list L.
• Return Invalid, otherwise. OStrong f) ecrypl i on(cr,ID ;,PKi): C performs the follow ing to decrypt the ciphertext cr = (C1, C2):
• Checks the validity of PK; and rejects the cipher text cr if this check fails, else proceeds with the following steps.
• Retrieves the tuple (ID;, g�i ,e; ) from list L.
• For each (m, r, h) E L2 list performs the following:
-Checks whether i? � Cl· -If True, computes kl = (PKp)) e i h and k2 = (PK?))h.
-Checks in list L3, for an entry corresponding to (k1,k2,ID;). If a tuple exists then retrieves the corresponding h3 value and checks whether ? C2 ffi h3 � (mll r), where m, r are retrieved from the list L2.
-If True, outputs m as the message.
• If no tuple satisfies all the above tests, returns
Invalid.
Challenge. At the end of Phase I, !ill produces two messages mo and ml of equal length and an identity ID*. C aborts the game if ID* cJ IDy, else randomly chooses a bit 0 Ell {O, I } and computes a ciphertext cr* with IDy as the receiver by performing the following steps:
• Set cj = IT, where b is taken from the RSA prob lem instance received by C and z is the value cho sen during the 0 H (.) oracle query corresponding to IDy.
• Choose c; ER {O, l } I +lz ?, dd l . • .911 should not query the partial private key corre sponding to IDy.
• .911 can query the secret value corresponding to IDy and PKy.
Guess. At the end of Phase II, .911 produces a bit 8' to C, but C ignores the response and performs the fol lowing to output the solution for the RSA problem instance.
• For each tuple of the form (kl ,k2,ID;,h3
(where e and bare taken from the RSA problem instance.)
• Outputs the corresponding kl value for which the above check holds as the solution (i.e, a = kJ) for the RSA problem instance.
Confidentiality against Type-II Adversary
Theorem 3.2 Our certificateless public key encryp tion scheme RSA-CLE I is IND-RSA-CLE1-CCA2-11 secure in the random oracle model, if the CCDH problem is intractable in Z�, where n = pq and p, q, (p -1) /2, (q -1) /2 are large prime numbers.
Due to page limitation we present the formal proof of this theorem in the full version of the paper (Selvi et aI., 20 10) .
4 FULLY RSA BASED CLE SCHEME (RSA-CLE2)
In this section, we propose the fully RSA based cer tificateless encryption scheme RSA-CLE2. The Type I security is similar to that of the Type-I security proof of RSA-CLEI . We prove the security of the scheme against Type-II attacks under adaptive chosen cipher text attack (CCA2) assuming the hardness of RSA problem.
The RSA-CLE2 Scheme
The proposed scheme comprises the following six al gorithms. Unless stated otherwise all computations except those in the setup algorithm are done mod n.
• Computes n = pq and the Euler's totient function </J(n) = (p-l)(q-l).
• It also chooses three cryptographic hash func tions H: {O, 1}* --+ Z�, H I : {O, 1}* x Z� --+ Z� dd ,
{O, 1}* --+ {O, 1}1+1;z�1, where I is the size of the message.
• Now, KGC publicizes the system parameters, params = (n,H,Hl ,H2,H3! and keeps the factors of n, namely p and q as the master private key.
Partial Key Extract. This algorithm is executed by the KGC and upon receiving the identity IDA of a user A the KGC performs the following to generate the cor responding partial private key dA.
• Chooses XA ER Z� dd .
• Computes gA = H(!DA)'
• Computes the partial public key PPKA = g�A • Computes the value eA = H I (!DA, PPKA).
• Computes dA such that eAdA == I mod </J(n) and sends the partial private key SA = XA + dA mod </J(n) and the partial public key PPKA to the user through a secure channel.
Set Private Key. On receiving the partial private key the user with identity IDA does the following to gen erate his secret key.
• Chooses two primes PA and QA, such that PA = 2P� + 1 and QA = 2Q� + 1, where P� and Q� are also primes.
• Computes NA = PAQA and the Euler's totient function </J(NA) = (PA -1)(QA -1).
• Chooses eA ER Z'N ' / as the user public key and computes JA == (j l mod </J(NA).
• Sets the private key as
Set Public Key. The user with identity IDA com putes the public key corresponding to his pri vate key as PKA = (PK ( I ) PK ( 2 ) PK ( 3 ) PK ( 4 ) \ A ' A ' A ' A /
(1) (P P KA, g� A ,e A, NA! and makes it public.
Note that g� A was sent by KCG to the user while set ting IDA's partial private key. The validity of the pub lic key can be publicly verified using the following verification test:
• Compute eA = Hl (IDA,PKj l )) and gA = H(IDA) '
• Check whether (PKj 2 ))CA � (PKj l )) e AgA
• Choose r ER Z� dd and g ER ZN A .
• Compute eA = Hl (IDA,PKj l )), gA = H(IDA) and h = H2(m,r).
--" :-YK(3)
) is send as the ciphertext to the user A.
Decryption. The receiver with identity IDA does the following to decrypt a ciphertext (J = (Cl , C2, C3):
• Computes kl = 1 and k2 = (C2) f) A mod Cl NA.
• Retrieves (m Ilr) = H3 (kl' k2,lD A) ffi C3· 
�.
User A accepts the message only if the above check holds.
4.1.1 Confidentiality against Type-I Adversary Theorem 4.1 Our certificateless public key encryp tion scheme RSA-CLE2 is IND-RSA-CLE2-CCA2-I secure in the random oracle model, if the RSA prob lem is intractable in Z�, where p, q, (p -1) /2 and (q -1) /2 are large prime numbers.
The proof for this theorem is similar to that of the Type-I proof of RSA-CLEl (IND-RSA-CLE1-CCA2-I).
Confidentiality against Type-II Adversary
Theorem 4.2 Our certificateless public key encryp tion scheme RSA-CLE2 is IND-RSA-CLE2-CCA2-II secure in the random oracle model, if the RSA prob lem is intractable in Z'N, where N = PQ and P, Q, (P -I) /2, (Q -I) /2 are large prime numbers.
Due to page limitation we present the formal proof of this theorem in the full version of the paper (Selvi et al., 20 10) .
COMPARISON STUDY
We compare our schemes with the two existing se cure schemes (Lai et aL, 2009 ) and (Sun et aL, 2007) . We compare the level of security offered by each schemes and the assumptions used to prove the secu rity against the two adversaries. The Type-I security of the scheme in (Lai et al., 2009 ) is based on RSA as sumption and thus operates on composite groups and is CPA secure against both Type-I and Type-II adver saries. The Type-II security is based on the composite computational Diffie Hellman Assumption (CCDH). Both Type-I and Type-II securities of the scheme in (Sun et al., 2007) are based on the CDH assump tion in multiplicative groups with prime order. Our schemes are based on RSA assumption and operates on composite groups. The major operations in all the schemes are multiplication and exponentiation, still, we do not consider them for the comparison due to the fact that the security parameters are different for RSA based schemes and schemes based on multiplicative groups with prime order. 
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed two CCA2 secure cer tificateless encryption schemes. For the first scheme the Type-I security is based on the RSA assumption and Type-II security is based on the composite com putational Diffie Hellman assumption. Both Type-I and Type-II securities of our second scheme are based on the RSA assumption. Our schemes are quite novel and based on entirely different key construct and pro tocol. It should be further noted that the existing schemes (Lai et al., 2009 ) and (Sun et al., 2007) con sider a security model in which the Type-I adversary is not provided the extract secret value oracle, for the target identity. Our security model is stronger be cause we permit the extract secret value oracle cor responding to the target identity to the Type-I adver sary. In fact, the scheme in (Lai et al., 2009 ) is not secure with this oracle access. However, in our secu rity model the secret value corresponding to the target identity is given to the Type-I adversary, which makes it stronger. Moreover, we provide strong decryption oracle for Type-I adversary, i.e, the decryption of a ciphertext is provided by the challenger even if the public key of the corresponding user is replaced af ter the generation of the ciphertext. Thus we provide a CCA2 secure CLE whose security is partly based on RSA and another scheme which is fully based on RSA assumption. We have proved the security of our schemes in the random oracle model. We leave it an interesting open problem to design a CLE scheme in the original model (Al-Riyami and Paterson, 2003) with the security of the scheme fully based on RSA assumption.
